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BANK TRUST DEPARTMENT INVESTMENT
SERVICES FOR CORRESPONDENT BANKS*
EDwARD

S.

HERMANt AND CARL F.

SAFANDAt

A number of the larger money center banks make available their
trust division's investment research material to a variety of customers on
a fee basis. Although begun as a service primarily for "correspondent
banks", 1 the type and variety of customers has been expanded and the
services of some of the larger suppliers in this market are now analogous
to those of registered investment advisers. These advisory activities often
pre-date the recent focus on conflict of interest problems of trust departments. The advising of these clients represents another fiduciary relationship---with its own advisor-client characteristics and obligations-in the
already impressive array to which a bank's management must be responsive.
In this article we consider the nature and economaic bases of these
advisory services offered by banks, some of the key problem areas which
have become apparent in recent years, and some points that would seem
to call for managerial, or in some cases regulatory, attention.
NATURE AND BASES OF BANK ADVIsORY SERVICES

Initially, money center banks with large research staffs ("suppliers")
made available their trust department investment research material
("service") to correspondent banks ("subscribers") in return for compensating balances. A number of the suppliers have now gone beyond this
market and include among their customers insurance companies, pension
funds, and individuals. A few also now compete for new customers mainly
on the basis of the scope and quality of the supplier's investment advisory
service.
* This article is a product of research conducted with the financial support of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School Center for the Study of Financial Institutions.
In this research the authors focused heavily on interviews with past and present trust
department personnel and customers; approximately 300 individuals representing 65
banks were interviewed during the period 1969-1972. Many of the statements made in
this article are based on these interviews.
t Professor of Finance, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
$ Former Fellow of the Center for Study of Financial Institutions.
1. Correspondent banking typically involves the provision of services by large
"city" banks to small "country" banks (correspondents); correspondent banks may be
offered a range of services including check clearing, international banking, personnel
training, and overline loans. For a discussion of correspondent banking markets, see
United States v. First National Bancorporation, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1003, 1016-18

(D. Colo. 1971).
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The number of banks offering advisory services to correspondents
is not known precisely, but according to informed participants in the
market fewer than ten banks are significant factors and the entire market
may not extend beyond thirty supplier banks.' A larger number of banks
provide occasional ad hoc investment advice to correspondents-answering particular questions or mailing out a variety of research reports-but
these banks have not organized this activity on a systematic fee basis. A
movement in this latter direction may be stimulated by the addition of
non-bank investment advisory units (acquired, spun-off from banks, or
newly created) as bank holding company affiliates. One curious feature of
this market is that perhaps six of the suppliers are subscribers to the service of the other leading suppliers.' Thus, the latter firms, recognized to
be market leaders, serve as wholesalers as well as retailers of bank advisory
service information.
The number of customers serviced by the larger suppliers in this
market is still not large. The Harris Trust, a major competitor in this
market, has over 200 subscriber bank clients.' Another major supplier has
just over 100 bank clients who constitute about two-thirds of its total
advisory service clientele.5 In 1968, an officer of a third major supplier
stated that:
We at the Bank of New York would like to think of ourselves
as having from time to time been innovators in the field of trust
investing. As you know, in addition to our own trust and investment counsel customers, we are privileged to work with over
300 banks, insurance companies, pension funds and other institutional investors in this country and abroad-the subscribers
to our Investment Inquiry Service.'
According to a more recent estimate, the number of advisory customers
served by the Bank of New York is now about 1 0 0 0 .'
Suppliers have entered this market for two main reasons. First,
they have used it as another avenue for acquiring deposits and enlarging
and consolidating customer relationships by offering an attractive service
to investment managers who realize that they have less capability in this
2.

See introductory note * supra.

3. Id.
4.

Young, Investment Management for ANY Size Trust Department, 111 TRUSTS

& EsTATEs 466 (1972).
5. See introductory note * supra.
6. Stenson, The tNew Look of Conservatism, 107 TRUSTS & ESTATE5 39, 41 (1968).
7. This estimate was made in an interview conducted by the authors. The interviews with present and former trust department personnel were granted on the understanding that names would remain confidential and therefore neither the name of the
individual nor that of his employer appears here or in similar citations below.
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area than the suppliers. The role of this service is thus similar to other
services rendered to smaller correspondent banks to attract them while at
the same time taking advantage of efficiencies of scale or locational
specialities accruing to large metropolitan institutions. Second, suppliers
have wanted to make money directly by utilizing more fully their own
research product and facilities. The overhead costs of a large research
operation are considerable, and the additional (or marginal) costs of
advising another client could be modest. It has been commonplace for
years that even the largest banks have had difficulty in keeping quality
security analysts, who have been bid away from them by Wall Street firms
who reach out to service a multitude of institutions, and who have the
great potential of large institutional commission rewards for research
excellence. To some extent, therefore, the advisory services of banks have
reflected their own struggles for economies of scale, the spreading of
high overhead expenses associated with quality investment research operations, and the effort to enhance the profitability of the commercial bank
trust department-a useful but sometimes only marginally profitable or
actual loss division of the bank.'
The demand for advisory services from smaller banks and other institutions arises from parallel efficiency considerations. If the larger institutions have problems in fully utilizing and providing compensation
and challenges to quality analysts and investment managers, these problems are more acute as trust asset volume diminishes. Of the over 3,000
banks with trust powers, no more than eighty manage assets of one billion
dollars or more.9 As a general rule, the smaller the trust asset volume
at a given bank, the greater the proportion of personal trust assets under
management, with the attendant co-trustees and tax and investment constraints that reduce the institution's ability ta continuously use its own
research skills for investment decision-making on a volume basis. For the
bulk of the smaller trust institutions, therefore, the development and internal generation of investment information is ruled out by cost considerations. For these subscriber banks, company visits and major independent investigations by trust department analysts are simply not available, to any significant degree, as bases for decision-making. Investment
performance is therefore almost totally dependent on the quality of research acquired from the outside and the effectiveness with which it is put
to use within the local bank.
There is great variation among subscriber banks in the way they use
S. This rationale is frequently suggested, Forbes, The Money Mew;: Look Out,
Wall Street!, Oct. 1, 1972, at 50.

9. American Banker, June 25, 1973, at 6.
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advisory services. The smaller ones tend to rely heavily on their supplier,
in some cases with encouragement by supplier banks:
Having worked in a medium-sized trust department at one
time, I feel that placing complete reliance on the organization
that you have selected to assist you [as supplier] and on their
analysts is a good thing to do, if you know.
. how to communicate with them. In other words, you can think of your
research department being located in New York City even if you
are located somewhere else."
Some of the larger correspondent subscribers may buy advice from a
number of brokers, institutional research houses, and other banks, whose
output they may monitor and compare, perhaps relying on different institutions for different types of issues, or depending primarily on one
service but hedging by checking out others.
Some subscribers may make all of their final decisions themselves
after due consideration of the body of information they have purchased
from others. At the other extreme, there are a number of correspondent
trust departments that are fully dependent on the specific recommendations of one or more outside advisers-in a real sense they may have
farmed out the decision-making to such outsiders. In quite a few cases,
advisory service personnel of supplier banks have noted that clients are
eager for something beyond mere investment information about securities followed-they want advice on precisely what they ought to buy and
sell, as manifested, for example, in what the supplier itself is buying and
selling; or they want specific buy-sell advice geared to their own portfolio
needs and objectives.
The investment service usually is sold by a special marketing arm
of the supplier's trust division. Typically, it is sold to banks and others
that have an ongoing, commerical relationship with the supplier bank.
Selling and servicing is often a joint operation of the trust and commercial departments; the closer relationship and regular customer calls
of commercial officers may make sales and service by them more economic.
Customer referrals by the supplier's commercial banking officers are
usually the major source of new leads for the investment service. This is
not always the case, however, as several of the leading banks offering an
investment advisory service have used it as a vehicle for extending their
business to banks with whom no previous commercial relationship existed.
10. Statement of -Willlam A. Stenson of The Bank of New York in
BANK TRUST INVESTMIENT RESULTS IN THE FIRST ANNUAL
CONFERENCE-MONEY MANAGEMENT 174 (Hontchar ed. 1968)
PROVING INVESTMENT].

IMPROVING
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR

[hereinafter cited as IM-
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It remains true, nonetheless, that competition in the furnishing of these
bank-sponsored investment advisory services is limited to some degree
by the edge given to supplier banks who already have established banking
and business relationships with potential subscribers. In part this edge
results from the fact that a small correspondent will attempt to garner as
many services as possible in return for its existing deposit balances (often
functioning as legal reserves for state banks) with its normal money
center banks. These are artificial constraints unrelated to the quality of
the investment service purchased.
There are sharp variations in the scope and quality of the services
offered by different supplier banks, which limits still further the competition among them. Most bank suppliers provide only a single information service, consisting of a body of written materials mailed out weekly
or monthly, plus occasional special reports. There is usually a call-in
privilege, ordinarily confined to a specially designated officer or group
within the supplier organization, and there are periodic gatherings
(usually annual) at the advisor's main office. There are, however, more
complex arrangements similar to those provided by the larger brokerage
houses. For example, one supplier bank offers the following grades of
advice:
I. Basic Service - The subscriber receives some of the
printed reports produced by the supplier and has the privilege of calling in with specific questions. The fee is a
100,000 dollar deposit balance in the supplier bank. [All
fees are on a yearly basis; thus the deposit is an average
or minimum for the same period.]
II. Expanded Service - The subscriber receives the Basic
Service plus more written material. The subscriber receives
the supplier bank's internal purchase and sales list if he
requests it. The fee is a 300,000 dollar deposit balance in
the supplier bank.
III. Super Service - The subscriber receives the Expanded
Service in addition to which the supplier bank will run
several model accounts for the particular subscriber and
will call the subscriber in case there is a development which
will change an opinion on a stock that is followed. Because
the supplier takes the initiative with respect to developments in stocks in subscriber accounts, supplier has a copy
of the portfolios held by the subscriber. The purchase
and sales list offered on request in the Expanded Service
is automatically sent as issued. The fee is a 300,000 dollar
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deposit balance in the supplier bank plus a 10,000 dollar
cash payment.
The printed material distributed by a supplier bank typically includes
the following: economics forecasts, corporate and municipal bond analyses, and reports on individual portfolio companies and industries.
One bank lists the following research material as being available to subscribers :
Estimate Changes (weekly)
Decisions of the Week (weekly)
Selected and Accumulation Lists (weekly)
Code Book (monthly)
Purchase List (monthly)
Investment Policy Statement (monthly)
Economic Review (quarterly) 1
Thus, a substantial part of the supplier's printed internal investment
information is passed on to subscribers. Typically, this material is mailed
to subscribers at the same time as, or shortly after, it is circulated within
the supplier's own organization.
An additional service, as noted, is the call-in privilege, which permits subscribers to call the supplier bank and have questions answered.
This is a key part of the service, according to one supplier bank officer:
We have found [at United States Trust Company] that
the material we send out is useful to our correspondents, [but]
I think even more useful is their ability to call and reach the
right person and get their questions answered. For this, we have
available two or three men, who are account. portfolio officers,
and they are active portfolio officers, otherwise, I don't think
they could give the right advice. Through them, or directly,
[correspondents] can talk to any of our analysts, economists,
or whoever else there is on the institution team-sometimes
on non-investment matters.
11.

Fisher, Using Investment Performance in Trust Business Development, 109
[hereinafter cited as Fisher]. "Estimate
changes" are changes in the pershare earnings. "Decisions of the week" are reports of
supplier bank committee action. "Selected and Accumulation Lists" are compilations
of stocks followed which are suitable for given investment objectives. The Code Book
contains "buy-sell-hold" designations for the stocks being followed. The Purchase List
contains the names of issues judged currently attractive. The Investment Policy Statement contains the department's attitude toward equity investment, portfolio composition
and the expected course of capital markets. The Economic Review states the economic
framework upon which the bank is basing its investment moves.
TRUSTS & ESTATES 677, 678, 680 (1970)
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I think the basic arrangement has obvious advantages, as
long as you can be sure of your people and be sure of your lines
of communication. This is what I know we had to be most careful about: that people really can get in touch with the people
they want to in our organization. 2
Suppliers often filter questions by subscribers through prescribed channels
(liaison personnel) thereby limiting direct access to trust department
research analysts. The liaison people monitor incoming questions from
subscribers and relay the responses given by the supplier's security analysts. Liaison officers frequently "interpret" information and its relevance, sometimes deciding that investment advice is appropriate for "'us"
(the supplier), but not appropiate for "them" (the subscribers). In
addition, liaison personnel may suggest that although a particular analyst
has a given opinion the subscriber may safely ignore it because the analyst
is not well qualified. Thus, through call-ins, a supplier may modify its
general investment advice to better suit the needs of a particular client.
The call-in privilege also gives subscribers the opportunity to find
out exactly what the supplier bank is purchasing and selling. Liaison
personnel usually honor these requests for trading information. As one
bank officer in charge of its service stated: "I will tell the correspondents
what the bank is buying and selling in detail and keep them right up to
date even though this may hurt us."'" It appears that many of the subscribers put great weight on this trading information, regarding it as a
shorthand way to determine what the supplier thinks of its own advice.
Some of the more refined and expensive services offer the subscriber
the opportunity of having the supplier employ its own initiative to suggest
new ideas or to modify previous recommendations. In that case, the advisory bank may maintain records of the portfolios of the subscriber (or
at least its major components) and take the initiative in calling about
stocks that are in these portfolios. This degree of attention is a response
to the demand of smaller banks for what is essentially outside decisionmaking rather than mere investment information.' Supplier banks have
12. Statement of Frederick IV.Goodrich of the United States Trust Company in
IMPROVING INVESTMENT, supra note 10, at 173-74.

13. Herman & Safanda, Allocating ruvestment Information, FIN. ANAL. J., Jan.Feb., 1973, at 23, 89 [hereinafter cited as Information]
14. The existence of institutions operating trust departments which are heavily
reliant on research information gathered by the supplier raises a question as to whether
subscribers are acting independently in making investment decisions. It is a basic trust
law principle that ministerial acts or duties may be delegated by trustees, but that duties
involving discretion and judgment may not. See, e.g., Palmer's Will, 132 N.Y.S.2d 311
(Sup. Ct. 1954); Kohler Estate, 348 Pa. 55, 33 A.2d 920 (1943). There may be a
question as to whether subscribers to a Super Service who place complete reliance on
the supplier are involved in an improper delegation of their discretionary duties.
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been reticent to become involved with regularly reviewing subscriber
portofolios, but will do this in special cases and for valued subscribers.
A number of supplier banks do, however, run model accounts for their
subscribers. According to one marketing officer, the model accounts are
representative accounts that the supplier bank runs on a hypothetical basis.
These models provide the basis for telephone discussions with the subscriber's trust department managers. Subscribers sometimes rely heavily
on these model portfolios in investing funds for new accounts.
Suppliers are also asked to provide advice to subscriber banks on a
variety of non-investment topics such as new trust business methods,
security clearing, etc. In sum, offering a service of this character creates
a complex web of relationships with subscribers, some of whose implications are considered below.
PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF BANIK ADvISORY SERVIcES

We shall now discuss a number of specific issues arising out of supplier bank activities: efficiency effects; mode of subscriber payment;
problems in the allocation of information; trading problems; and the effects of the commercial relationship.
Efficiency Effects
As we have noted, one purpose of offering bank investment advisory
services is said to be the fuller utilization of research capabilities, and thus
greater operational efficiency. The incremental cost of providing new
clients with information already being generated for existing clients can be
small. The reduction in overhead cost per unit-of-service may permit a
A trustee may act upon the advice of others if he makes the final decision. Mills v.
Bluestein, 275 N.Y. 317, 9 N.E.2d 944 (1937) (action based upon a report or assurance
of another is not a delegation of duties or powers). See also Lutz v. Boas, 176 A.2d
853 (Del. Ch. 1961) (brokerage firm liable for management fee paid by mutual fund to
investment adviser whose firm did the work for which the investment adviser was
compensated).
Thus, a subscriber bank must-if it wishes to avoid an improper delegation-make
the final decision regarding the particular securities to be sold or purchased for its accounts. As stated in Cooper v. Illinois Central R. Co., 38 App. Div. 22, 57 N.Y.S. 925

(1899) :
The investment of trust funds, the substitution of one security for another, the
doing of any act by which the character or security of the trust investment may
be in any respect changed or affected, these are matters that call for the exercise
of judgment and discretion .
Id. at 29, 57 N.Y.S. at 928.

Suppliers providing information to subscribers who are merely rubber stamping the
recommendations of the supplier are thereby participating in a technical breach of trust.
Suppliers often complain that some clients are looking for assistance in actual
decision-making, not merely advice on the characteristics of securities and security
markets. Where these clients have received decision-making advice in the form of
model portfolios and recommendations for specific purchases for specific accounts,

effective decision-making may have been turned over to the supplier.
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better or cheaper research operation. For these effects to be substantial,
of course, the service would have to be sizeable; larger in fact than the
investment advisory service of all but a few banks.
The efficiency effect of an investment advisory service may be compromised if the special needs of the individual advisory clients, or their
ability to strike favorable bargains with the supplier bank, eliminate any
economic advantage to the supplier bank or its trust department. The
desire to build and protect the customer relationship is a primary purpose
of the advisory service. Solicitude for the customer and consideration
for other business done with him, now or in the future, might easily
cause the recources devoted to the advisory service to exceed its revenues.
Some banks, in fact, have found it difficult to extract satisfactory additional deposits from their correspondents in return for a new advisory
service (which has led a few of them to try to make the service available
only on a fixed cash fee basis). Supplier banks also find it difficult to
establish fee levels that reflect the amount of contact and aid required by
a clientele which varies markedly in investment sophistication and interest.
The net effect of the installation of an investment advisory service
has been favorable for some of the larger suppliers, but for many other
market participants the direct effects remain negative. Clearly, this result
does not preclude substantial beneficial effects to the bank as a whole that
are not reflected in the income statement of the trust department. For
example, good service for correspondents may facilitate their retention
as purchasers of other services such as municipal bonds underwritten by
the supplier bank.
The effect of the development of an investment advisory service on
the trust department's ability to service its internal accounts is likely to
depend on circumstances in individual cases. If the advisory service is
large, there is a possibility of an operational efficiency spill-over to other
accounts, although the call-in privilege and direct allocation of resources
to the needs of advisory clients may dissipate some or all of the potential
net benefits to internal accounts. With small advisory operations, on the
other hand, the possibility of negligible or negative (but probably still
minor) effects is greater.
Deposits as the Mode of Subscriber Payment
The compensation of bank suppliers of investment services is usually
taken in the form of a deposit balance from the subscriber. Deposit balances, as opposed to direct cash payments, can range from a low of about
two thirds to a high of close to 100 per cent of advisory service compensation. Typically, the trust department receives an earnings credit for

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

436

generating commercial department deposit balances.1" Frequently, however, these credits do not fully cover the cost (to the trust department)
of the services rendered.
Several issues may be raised by the dominance of deposit balances as
the mode of payment for investment advisory services. For one thing, this
reflects a breach in the "wall" between commercial and trust operations ;"G
the depositor-subscriber is usually a customer of the commercial arm as
well as the trust department, and in some banks, as we have noted, the
servicing and even the marketing of the advisory service is in the hands
of commercial officers. Communications and negotiations must take
place between the departments as to the allocation of deposit credits, and
a conflict of interest between the departments is a conspicuous possibility.
For example, the commercial arm may wish to accommodate a trust
customer's demands for low advisory rates in order to strengthen its
broader relationships with the customer, while the trust department may
seek higher rates.
A second issue is the question of whether the commercial arm is
purchasing benefits (deposits, better customer relationships) by the sale
of information paid for by trust fees and commission dollars attributable
to the supplier bank's own trust accounts. This would seem to be the case
if one views the material distributed to subscribers as being an asset of
the trusts under management and if this asset has not been contractually
offered to the supplier as part of the management fee for these accounts.
It could then be argued that the trustee is making an indirect profit from
the use of a trust asset."7 This argument is hardly weakened when the
15. In one large supplier bank the trust department receives its compensation as
follows:
If the subscriber is required to maintain a $100,000 deposit balance with sup-

plier and the prime interest rate is at 6% (assuming that it stays constant for
the year) then the profit to the supplier bank would be: Profit = [6% X
($100,000 - reserve)] - cost. In this particular bank, where the trust de-

partment is in a strong bargaining position, the "cost" figure is determined independently by the trust department and is equivalent to their personnel costs
of providing the service, mailing and printing costs plus a share of the trust
department overhead. Currently, the trust department is charging the commer-

cial department an amount roughly equivalent to 4% of the total required deposit. Supplier bank profits from the service are thus dependent on two factors: first, the spread between the prime rate and the "cost" figure, and
secondly, economies of scale which operate to reduce this "cost" figure as more

customers are added. This purchase of deposits by the commercial department
may result in a loss for the commercial department if the prime rate drops or
a loss of customers occurs.
See introductory note * sufpra.
16. Herman & Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust Department and the "Wall,"

14 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 21 (1972).
17.

Basic fiduciary principles caution against trustees taking any indirect or secret

trust funds:
profits
by rule
using[trustee's
This
duty of complete loyalty] is sufficiently broad to embrace
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rcsearch sold is financed by commission dollars generated by the trust
accounts."8 According to standard fiduciary practices, any value produced
by these commissions should, it seems, revert back to the benefit of the
trusts under management. Thus, when a supplier bank finances its research partly from trust generated brokerage, and then uses the advisory
service to attract additional deposits from subscribers, it is using the
commercial arm as an affiliate through which the supplier recaptures
for itself some of the value produced by these commissions. 9 The supplier is, of course, refining the information received so that this is not a
simple and direct recapture situation. The research product, hovever, is
paid for by the fees and commissions generated by internal accounts.
Problems in the Allocation of Information
The effect of an advisory service on the timing with which information is made available to different accounts is complex." In general, we
would expect the internal accounts of supplier banks ta be favored because
of the relatively strong personal relationships operative within the bank
and the ease of communication within the confines of the trust department. This is not always the case, however, as some subscribers who are
both aggressive and very good customers demand priority service; and
transactions with trust funds resulting in indirect profit to the trustee, such as
commissions or compensation as brokers or bankers or for other professional

or business services.
Bryan v. Security Trust Co., 296 Ky. 95, 100, 176 S.W.2d 104, 108 (1943). This fiduciary principle is embodied in § 17(e) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-17(e) (1970). See Provident Management Corp., SEC Exchange Act
Release No. 9028 (Dec. 1, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP.
177, 937 (SEC 1970).
18. In earlier years, banks used the bulk of commissions derived from trading for
trust accounts to acquire deposits that accrued to the benefit of the bank as a whole.
This practice has become legally untenable. Fiske, How Banks Pass Out Commissions,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESToR, Dec. 1969, at 29, 30.
The recent imposition of negotiated rates on large securities transactions has tended
to reduce the total brokerage to the bank; but out of the total still remaining, the purchase of research services for the trust accounts has been increased somewhat on an
absolute basis, very substantially on a relative basis.
19. It is common for mutual fund prospectuses to contain language to the effect
that investment information supplied to the management company in return for fund
brokerage commissions is not "essential" and "does not necessarily reduce the expenses"
of the management company (e.g., the management fee should not be reduced in return
for the use of these "soft" commissions). Like supplier banks, management companies
may use this information for other purposes-for example, to service investment counseling accounts-without crediting the fund for any of this "value" produced. Should
negotiated rates drop to levels covering only pure execution costs, and should research
be sold for "hard" dollars, one might argue that neither funds nor trust accounts could
be tapped for research expenditures since this information is by admission not "essential"
-purchasing research could arguably be a waste of assets by a fiduciary. In addition,
the loss of this source of information would not increase the investment advisor's "expenses" so that increased management fees could not be premised on the requirement of
hard dollars for research.
20. Information, supra note 13 at 23, 91.
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customers paying for "Super Service" may receive information at least
as timely as many of the internal accounts.
The timeliness of information to subscribers may depend in part on
the position and aggressiveness of the supplier bank advisory service's
liaison personnel. Allocation of information favorable to subscribers may
occur, for example, because the service's liaison officer participates in the
meetings of the key stock selection committee and begins calling subscribers even before the minutes of the meeting are available to internal
account portfolio managers. In addition, the call-in process may contribute to preferential treatment of at least some subscribers by making information available to correspondents before it has been digested and used
by the supplier's own account managers."'
Despite this occasional preferential treatment the bulk of advisory
service clients receive information less quickly than internal account
managers and "Super Service" subscribers. Most advisory clients receive
printed reports sent by mail, which normally reach them after the material
has been distributed internally and to select outside clients.
This variable timing in the availability of investment information
gives rise to a number of potential conflict of interest problems for banks.
Are the secondary recipients of information aware of their lesser status?
Are they made aware of whether and when the bank is buying recommended securities for its discretionary accounts? Does the delay work to
their detriment as investors and to the advantage of those accounts receiving information first? Does the lack of formal and consistent procedures
by banks in the distribution of timely information result in an unplanned
and chaotic sort of discrimination among customers? Are these conflict
possibilities likely to materialize in quantitatively significant effects? For
a trustee of multiple trusts, differentiation of treatment by classes of clients
will certainly be legally hazardous without adequate disclosure to interested parties. Even with disclosures the situation is not entirely clear.
The standard of conduct to be observed by an investment adviser
in allocating information between accounts has rarely been litigated. In
the few relevant cases, litigation usually has arisen where an adviser or the
adviser's personnel were dealing with information in a manner that benefited their own institutional or personal accounts. This litigaton has
typically been based on the application of fraud concepts under rule lOb-5. 2'
21. Concern for non-discretionary internal accounts has been expressed, as follows,
by a trust officer of the First National Bank of Chicago:
We manage numerous accounts, and on many we have co-trustees or consultants.
When we are rapidly liquidating our position in falling star airlines do our
"consult" accounts get what is left of a "bombed out" market?
Vanderpoel, Perforinance-TrustInvestment Style, 106 TRusTs & ESTATES 358 (1967).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
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Suppliers provide a variety of written material for their subscribers
and these activities are not unlike those of other investment advisers who
publish "market letters". In SEC v. Capital Gains' Research Bureau,
Inc.,2" defendant Capital Gains and its owner, both registered investment
advisers, published a monthly report of broad circulation which gave advice on particular securities. On several occasions the investment adviser
purchased or sold short, shares of a security before recommending it in
its report and sold or covered the shares within several days after publication of the recommendation. Defendants engaged in this practice, known
as "scalping", without disclosng either the purchase or sale to their
clients. The Commission sought an injunction to compel defendants to
disclose this practice. The Supreme Court upheld the grant of an injunction reasoning, in part, that defendants were fiduciaries with respect to
their advisory clients and, as such, must avoid placing themselves in conflict of interest situations and must make full disclosure to their clients
before engaging in trading of this sort. Thus, non-disclosure of information material to an evaluation of the disinterestedness of investment advice
is one variety of securities fraud. The rationale for this conclusion is that:
An adviser who. . . secretly trades on the market effect of his
own recommendation, may be motivated-consciously or unconsciously-to recommend a given security not because of its
potential for long-run price increase (which would profit the
client), but because of its potential for short-run price increase
in response to anticipated activity from the recommendation
(which would profit the adviser).4

Suppier banks, although not subject to the Investment Advisers Act and
its registration and reporting requirements, are subject to the same broad
fiduciary duties." Thus, a supplier who acquires a position for favored
accounts in a security about to be recommended may be "scalping" some
subscribers and less favored accounts in violation of rule 10b-5.26
23. 191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 300 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1961), reaff'd en
banc, 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962), revld, 375 U.S. 180 (1963). The case is discussed in

Comment, The Regulation of Investient Advice: Subscription Advisers and Fiduciary
Duties, 63 MICH. L Rv. 1220 (1963) ; Note, Stock Sc-alping by the Investment Adviser:
Fraud or Legitimate Busizess Practice, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 232 (1963) ; Note, Ifvestment
Advisers and Disclosure of and Intent to Trade, 71 YALE L.J. 1342 (1962).
24. SEC v. Capital Gains, Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 196 (1963).
25. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY OF THE UNITED STATES, COMPTROLLER'S MANUAL FOR REPRESENTATIVES IN TRUST D-1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
26. See, e.g., Corporate Disclosure and Insider Information, FIN. ANAL. FED., Oct.
7, 1968, at 22 (remarks of Phillip A. Loomis, Jr.) :
[W]e have encountered situations, where some well known investment advisory
firms whose recommendations carry weight, the mere fact that X & Co. says
that the stock is a buy is likely to lead not only X & Co.'s numerous customers
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In the Kidder, Peabody case," the manager of the Kidder, Peabody
Special Investment Advisory Service, a registered investment adviser,
made preferential transactions for certain clients. The manager and
certain of his relatives participated in the Special Service and their accounts purchased or sold before other accounts, at prices which were more
favorable. The Commission in dealing with Kidder, Peabody's offer of
settlement stated the facts to be that:
Although certain of Goodnow's [the manager's] clients from
time to time may have been informed generally that Goodnow
was engaging in transactions in the same securities being
recommended to them and acquired for their accounts, or that
Goodnow had acquired a position in such securities, registrant
did not adopt any specific policy of requiring specific disclosure
of Goodnow's activities to clients unrelated to Goodnow, and
no such disclosure was included in the printed recommendation
and consent cards sent to clients in consummating transactions
in the Special Service. Accordingly, when specific purchases
or sales were made for individual advisory clients, such clients
were not informed of the nature, terms and sequence of the purchase or sale for the personal account of Goodnow or for the
accounts of Goodnow's relatives.2 8
The Commission's conclusion was that:
The Advisers Act was aimed at eliminating conflicts of interest
between an investment adviser and his clients. Consequently,
an investment adviser must not effect transactions in which he
has a personal interest in a manner that could result in preferring
his own interest to that of his advisory clients. Furthermore
whenever trading by an investment adviser raises the possibility
of a potential conflict with the interests of his advisory clients,
the investment adviser has an affirmative obligation before
engaging in such activities to obtain the informed consent of his
but the market generally to react. In those situations, we have raised a question
about the practice of such a firm sending out advance telegraphic notations to a
few clients as to what it's going to recommend next, and sending the rest of
them the same recommendations by second-class mail. In this situation are
they sure that the less-favored customers are entirely aware of what's going on?
The market effect produced by a bank's advisory service could be similar, and the
absence of disclosure might be equally glaring.
27. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8426
(Oct. 16, 1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REl'. f[ 77, 618, at 83,

321 (SEC 1968).
28. Id. at 83, 322.
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clients on the basis of full and fair disclosure of all material
facts."
Broadly speaking, the Kidder, Peabody decision requires, among
other things, the disclosure of material facts which would be helpful to cient in evaluating the adviser's motivations in recommending a particular security-whether the motivations be obvious or merely holding forth
a potential for influencing investment judgment. Such a requirement may
have broad application to supplier bank investment advisory services,
since subscribers may have a legitimate interest in obtaining facts about
the "nature, terms and sequence of the purchase or sale" of those recommended securities which are traded for preferential internal accounts.
With respect to selective dissemination of research information,
several recent pronouncements by the SEC raise questions as to the
normal method of supplier operations. In its Future Structure Statement,
the SEC stated:
[W]e believe that a broker is obliged to communicate any
material changes in his prior investment advice arising from
subsequent research he may do to all customers whom he knows
have purchased and may be holding shares on the basis of his
earlier advice, at least under circumstances where to do so would
not impose an unreasonable hardship on the broker."'
In the Butcher & Sherrerdcase,"' the brokerage firm consented to an SEC
finding that it had violated its obligation to deal fairly with all customers, 2 when, after changing its investment opinion of Penn Central
stock, that change was communicated only on a selected basis to certain
29. Id. at 83, 324.
30. SEC, Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets, BNA
SEc. REG. L. REP., Feb. 2, 1972, pt. II, at 6.
31. Butcher & Sherrerd, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9894 (Dec. 11,
1972), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. Ri. ff 79, 135 at 82, 460 (SEC
1972)

32. In a letter to all of its customers dated December 15, 1972, Butcher & Sherrerd
discussed the SEC settlement as follows:
The SEC's criticism concerns the internal operations of Butcher & Sherrerd.
It relates to the firm's procedures in disseminating the sale recommendation,
in assuring that the recommendation was passed on to all of our customers,
and in regulating the sequence in which all holdings were sold.
Neither the SEC, nor any national security exchange nor the National Association of Security Dealers, nor any other regulatory agency had then, nor
for that matter has as yet, promulgated any rules or guidelines to assist the
securities industry in determining what procedures should be followed in disseminating a change in recommendation with regard to a security. ...
The procedures which Butcher & Sherrerd followed were in line with those
prevalent in the industry and one which it believed to be proper. . . . No
customers were given intentional preference over others. Obviously, all could
not have been contacted simultaneously.
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preferred customers, and not to others who still held shares of the stock
which they had purchased on the firm's recommendation.33 These SEC
pronouncements give little guidance as to what conduct might be deemed
"fair" in an altered factual context, but they do suggest, once again, that
a supplier may be held to fiduciary standards of conduct-principally the
duty to treat all clients fairly-in dealing with subscribers. When a supplier's conduct is judged "unfair", liability may be imposed for breach of
fiduciary duty. 4
A critical fact, then, is the nature and amount of disclosure made by
suppliers to subscribers; particularly disclosure as to those practices which
give rise to potential conflicts of interest in the allocation of investment
information. In many cases, regular investment advisory subscribers
are aware of their status as secondary recipients of information, since
they are told the different characterstics of ordinary versus "Super
Service" in the process of negotiating an advisory relationship. Presumably they choose a lesser service on grounds of price and/or their estimate
of their own needs. Besides this presumption of a knowledgeable choice,
common sense should make their secondary status clear to many subscribers. There may be exceptions to this assumed subscriber awareness,
however, where salesmen stress the merits of a particular service thought
to be acceptable to a client or where a client is limited in his choice because
of constraints on the use of his deposits: in both cases, the subscriber
may not be motivated to investigate the other form of service. Finally,
where the supplier offers only one type of service, there is less reason for
explicit mention of delays.
Subscribers to regular (as opposed to Super) service are generally
not told whether the supplier bank has bought or sold recommended
securities for its discretionary accounts. If the bank recommends a
33. Butcher & Sherrerd, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9894 (Dec. 11,
1972), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FFD. SEc. L. RES. ff 79, 135 at 82, 460 (SEC

1972).
34. Based on general trust law principles of loyalty and fairness, one court discussed the trustee's standard of conduct as follows:
[TJhe handling of multiple trusts, of necessity, calls for a high degree of care
and a sense of extreme loyalty upon the part of a trustee as to each of his
various trusts. It must be evident that this obligation is made more difficult as
the size and number of the trusts for which he is trustee increase. . . . In
oral argument it was stated that at least one trust company in Cleveland is
trustee for more than 5,000 separate trusts. Under such circumstances, undivided loyalty to each trust is obviously almost an insuperable task, since there
must exist a temptation and the urge of special circumstances to favor one
trust over another in times when changing markets and other considerations
make some securities desirable and others already in hand undesirable. Nothing but extreme diligence and fair dealing will, under the law, exonerate a
trustee placed in such circumstances.
In re Binder's Estate, 137 Ohio St. 26, 34; 27 N.E.2d 939, 946 (1940).
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security, it might seem reasonable to assume that the bank has bought or
will buy it for internal accounts, but this is not always the case and it
emains true that many advisory service clients do not know what the
supplier bank has done. Furthermore, supplier banks often do not :"'recommend" securities in the written reports sent out to advisory clientsthey try to stick to factual presentations and estimates, and general
evaluations of quality, eschewing specific buy-sell advice. By this means,
they reduce their own involvement in advisory client decisions, and, hopefully, their own potential conflict with client decisions arising out of that
advice. The problem is that the concept of "neutral" advice may be
difficult to sustain, and recommendations may creep in by the back door
(e.g., in changes in language used, or via remarks from bank personnel
responding to a call-in).
Since the supplier has promised both internal accounts and selected
subscribers that they will receive timely information, it is of some interest
as to how banks proceed in situations where there is an immediate, compelling change dictated by newly received information. Few banks have
established rules and procedures that would alleviate allocation problems
in a case where timeliness may be important. What is likely to ensue is
the diffusion of this information from select internal and "Super Service"
clients out to the lesser clients, with the latter receiving the information
according to aggressiveness and chance (timeliness of their call-ins, for
example), and to the vicissitudes of the mails.
Some bankers claim that the problem of delayed or selective receipt
of information is unimportant because: (1) the recipients of bank advisory services are sophisticated; (2) the bank could not afford to mistreat any of its subscribers because of their importance to the bank; (3)
the differences in objectives (and the conservative, long term investment
orientation) of most subscribers makes timeliness less consequential; (4)
the time lags are too short to be operationally significant; and finally,
(5) "hot information"-information so important and so reliable that
it must be acted upon, but still usable within the limits of the securities
laws-is virtually nonexistent.
The experience of the larger suppliers in operating these services is
not compatible with the conclusion that subscribers are sophisticated or
that timing in the receipt of information is unimportant, especially
where a supplier offers several levels of service. These issues are complex," but even if the quantitative significance of allocational inequities
is not great, differentials in the receipt of timely information creates problems that must be dealt with by supplier bank managements.
35.

Some of these issues are treated in Information, supra note 13.
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Trading Problems
The discussion of the trading problems of supplier banks will be
divided into two parts: trading by the supplier, and trading by supplier
bank research personnel and portfolio managers. The concern here arises
out of the potential of the supplier for affecting the market in recommended securities. This ability results from the supplier bank's sole possession of pre-publication knowledge concerning the content of its future
recommendations to subscribers.
1. Trading by the supplier
One of the problems confronting many of the larger trust departments is the effect of their trading-when buying or selling for a large
number of accounts-on the market price of an issue. Given the market
power, over the short term, of a large supplier with a substantial subscriber
clientele, an investment recommendation by the supplier may be a selffulfilling prophecy. In part, the problem has been brought about by a
change in the investment philosophy of many trust institutions who have
now chosen to concentrate their substantial trust investments in a relatively small number of issues:
It is obviously important to abandon broad diversification as
the traditional safety valve against undue risk. You may be
interested to know that as large a Trust Company as we
[United States Trust] are, twenty of our largest common
stock holdings represent over fifty per cent of the market value
of all common stocks held here at the Trust Company. In lieu
of broad diversification one should substitute selectivity and
improve that selectivity."
It is true that most bank subscribers have been conservative buyers of
N.Y.S.E. blue-chips with large capitalization, but in an effort to achieve
better investment performance a number of subscriber clients have been
willing to assume increased risks and invest in stocks with smaller equities.
Investment in stocks with smaller capitalization enhances trading problems, because with these thin securities there is a greater likelihood of
wide price fluctuations when supplier banks are making major trading
moves.17 Where an investment in a thin stock is planned by a supplier
bank, potential conflict situations may easily arise.
36. Fisher, supra note 11, at 681.
37. For evidence that institutional investors can have some impact on the price of
the stock of smaller and less seasoned companies, see I. FRiEND, M. BLUME & J. CROCKETT,
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Assume a supplier bank possesses knowledge of a prospective increase
in price based on its own contemplated investment in a thin issue. In this
case, the supplier has the potential to create preferential trading sequences
to the advantage of select internal accounts or select subscribers with little
opportunity for other clients to discover this pattern. As subscribers and
internal accounts act on the supplier's initial recommendation, the supplier
will become more important--directly, or indirectly as the source of the
recommendation-in the market for a particular company's stock. Without adequate institutional disclosure, it is not possible for a subscriber to
determine what effect the supplier bank's activities are having on the
market price of the issue. Currently, supplier banks are not making any
periodic, formal disclosures of their trading activity in recommended
stocks. In addition, some supplier banks do not formally warn their
subscribers of the limited marketability of recommended issues.
By serving both internal accounts and subscribers, the supplier as
fiduciary is thus placing himself in a position requiring him to exercise
extreme diligence in order that both types of clients are dealt with fairly.2
The supplier must execute transactions for internal accounts in such a
manner that the client's total cost or proceeds are the most favorable under
the circumstances.2 If the sequence of discretionary purchases by the
advising banks or the time sequence of informtion flows to different
grades of customers is likely to result in a built-in price disadvantage for
certain classes of advisory clients, it is possible that this potential may
have to be made very clear and explicit by an advisor wishing to avoid
liability within an inherently discrimnatory structure.
2. Trading by supplier bank personnel
Trading by bank personnel on the basis of pre-publication knowledge
is not subject to active supervision by the banks, and the rules governing
conduct here are generally enforced by the "honor system"." Trading by
38. See, e.g., Epworth Orphanage v. Long, 207 S.C. 384, 36 S.E.2d 37, 44 (1945).
39. In Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8426 (Oct. 16, 1968), [1968-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REPI. [ 77,618, at
83, 323, the Commission stated:
One of the basic duties of a fiduciary is the duty to execute securities transactions for clients in such a manner that the client's total cost or proceeds in
each transaction is the most favorable under the circumstances.
40. Employee trading becomes more than an ethical problem where the supplier
bank has represented that it is free from conflicts of interest. In one bank where employee trading is governed by the "honor code," prospective customers are given promotional literature that states:
No estate or trust buys from or sells to another trust account. The Bank itself does not trade in securities of any trust account-and the same rule applies
to officers and employees as individuals. Not only is this a long standing
policy of the Bank, but is also strictly enforced by the Bank examiners.
Under the honor code applied in this bank, no one knows whether the bank's policy has
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bank personnel on the basis of internal information does occur, although
on a scale inherently difficult to ascertain. Where a bank is running an
investment research service, there is the potential for the supplier's account
managers to purchase recommended issues for their personal accounts
before the recommendation is communicated to subscribers. Given the
fact that a large number of subscriber institutions may be acting on the
basis of the supplier bank's recommendation, trading on the basis of this
anticipated demand or supply could prove profitable for an individual
with access to pre-publication information. Moreover, absence of disclosure requirements enables supplier bank personnel to operate relatively
free of liability risks."'
Commercial Customer Constraints on Investment Advice
In the marketing of information services to correspondents and other
subscribers, suppliers represent that the advice given is not only competent
but that it is also disinterested. Several subscriber banks have stated that
they chose a bank-sponsored rather than a broker-sponsored service because of the impartiality of a bank research staff in appraising a company's
prospects and the absence of commission generation as a motive for their
recommendations.
Although the criteria for choice may be valid on a relative basis, it is
sometimes not fully disclosed to a subscriber that there may be unstated
constraints placed upon the supplier's investment advice resulting from its
commercial relationship. Reports written by analysts which are available
for distribution to subscribers often are toned down or relayed verbally
if they may offend valued commercial customers of the supplier. Thus,
the content of a report reaching subscribers may be unlike the original if
it is potentially dangerous financially for the bank to publish uncomplimentary statements about its commercial customer. It appears that supplier bank analysts have experienced problems in attempting to have the
stocks of good commercial customers removed from the bank's approved
list; commercial pressures have often gathered to defeat these attempts,
and the analysts affected feel that the customer relationship precluded
removal irrespective of investment merit.
Problems of a conflict nature also may arise where the supplier makes
a trading recommendation about a commercial customer that is currently
engaged in financing operations with the bank. For example, a supplier
could recommend a stock which was issued, in part, to pay off loans made
been violated or not-employees are not required to submit any brokerage reports to
verify their activities. Enforcement by bank examiners would only cover cases of direct
dealing between employees and trust accounts. MANUAL, supra note 25 at § 9.12.
41. Compare this situation to the disclosure requirements in the case of a registered
investment adviser. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 120 (Oct. 16, 1961).
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by the supplier.4 2 One may expect commercial department interests to be
intensified when the safety of loans or their repayment is in question.
Conflicts of this variety go to the very nature of the advice being sold
to subscribers. There is a real question, of course, whether conflicts of
interest arising out of commercial relationships are quantitatively important. The Institutional Investor Study data suggested a surprisingly small
impact on the composition of trust department portfolios arising out of
commercial relationships;" whether the impact on investment advisory
service clients would turn out to be larger is an open question.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The business of trust departments of commercial banks has gradually
changed from one principally oriented toward the conservation of the assets of testamentary trusts, under court supervision, to the management
of assets of a variety of investor types with different objectives, relatively
free from outside supervision.4 Today, the operations of large trust departments are important factors in the market for investment advice.
The establishment by banks of investment advisory services for the
benefit of subscriber banks adds further complications to an already impressive set of potential conflicts of interest. Such advisory services bring
with them a new avenue for deposit-buying in the interests of the bank as
a whole. Also, the possibility of discriminatory treatment in the provision
and use of information among different classes of customers-already a
problem among the various types of internal accounts-is enhanced by the
establishment of new groups of external customers.
The extent to which banks have neglected to deal with these problems
ex ante, prior to a legal or legislative onslaught, is reminiscent of their
handling of trust departments, uses of brokerage to purchase deposits, or
the insider problem in the 1960s and earlier.
Currently, supplier banks are relatively unsupervised with respect to
the operation of these services--on the theory that the services are being
42. As evidence of the fact that a bank might find this an acceptable practice, the
First National Bank of Chicago in the Declaration of Trust for its Group Fund A for
Pension and Profit Sharing Trusts includes the following language:
Section 6.3 Investments.
No investment shall be deemed improper or imprudent merely because the Bank
has participated in any way in the issuance, underwriting or original sale
thereof, or because a part or all of the proceeds received by the issuer or seller
are used or to be used to satisfy any obligation to the Bank.
43. SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., vol. 2, at 2727-29 (1971).
44. Several trust companies have recently been organized without traditional commercial banking facilities, but with trust operations, to take advantage of the exemption
from registration existing for trust companies under the Investment Advisers Act. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a) (11) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a) (11) (A) (1970).
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offered to sophisticated institutions that need little protection via traditional forms of regulation; partly also because suppliers and subscribers
are subject to some form of regulation already; and partly in the belief or
hope that the forces of competition will force suppliers to play a fair
game. 5 These assumptions should be re-examined because: (1) services
are being offered to individuals as well as to institutions; (2) the investment acumen of many of the subscribers cannot be assumed; and (3) the
forces of competition have been only partially successful in penetrating
the larger community of interests existing between particular suppliers and
subscribers, who frequently have well established commercial correspondent relationships.
As a result of our examination of this area, the following recommendations may be made:
(1) It would seem a desirable protection for both supplier banks and
advisory clients that there be written disclosure of any actual or potential
preferential sequences in the receipt of information or trading in recommended securities. This is done informally by many banks in explaining
to internal customers why the bank should be given full investment discretion. This principle should be extended and formalized.
(2) It would seem desirable that trading information be provided by
supplier banks to all subscriber clients in a form that would set forth, for
successive time periods, the transactions in recommended securities made
by supplier banks for their trust department accounts (with some minimum dollar value of transactions fixed to avoid trivial purchases and
sales). No other trading information could be given out by a supplier.
By this process, only the discretionary accounts of the supplier bank could
benefit from trading by discretionary accounts themselves.
(3) It would seem desirable to have full disclosure to supplier banks
and to some supervisory agency of all trading by bank officers and trust
department personnel in securities held or recommended by the supplier
bank.
(4) Where securities of commercial customers are analyzed and
evaluated for the benefit of advisory service clients, the existence of com45. A similar argument was offered by the Comptroller of the Currency in 1967,
in connection with bank underwriting of revenue bonds:
[P]roviding correspondent services, of which investment portfolio advice is but
a part, is a highly competitive business. To contend that an underwriting
bank would recommend inferior securities to its customers because it underwrote such securities is unrealistic. The risk of losing correspondents will
afford adequate assurance that the underwriting bank will give the best possible
advice to its correspondents.
Hearings on S. 1306 Before the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions of the Senate Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 21 (1967) (Statement of William B.
Camp, Comptroller of the Currency).
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mercial relationships should be disclosed. A commercial customer could
be defined as any issuer having a line of credit from or a deposit account
at the bank in excess of a given amount, say 100,000 dollars. Interlocking relationships of personnel should also be specifically disclosed to subscribers.
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